Contents "The internationalist proletarian" n.15
SYRIA: COLLAPSE OF A DECAYED REGIME, CAPITALIST CONTINUITY
The regime of Bashar el Asad has collapsed in a matter of days in the face of a Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HST) offensive. What began as an apparently preventive strike by the Turkish-backed militia to require the Syrian and Russian armies to stop shelling Idlib province has ended up as a triumphal march to the capital as regime forces defected or joined the militiamen. In just two days they had conquered Aleppo with surprising ease.
Then came the “call between the Russian and Turkish foreign ministers, Sergey Lavrov and Hakan Fidan (...) indicated a Russian communiqué ‘the need to coordinate joint action to stabilize the situation’.” (La Vanguardia, 01-12-2024). There was still limited action by the Russian military with shelling of Aleppo and Idlib and the Iranian foreign minister met with El Asad apparently to support him but: “Araghchi responded that Iran was no longer in a position to send forces to support him anyway.” (Financial Times, 08-12-2024).
On that same day “the Syrian army announced that the rebels had entered Hama. (...) the command of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces in a statement assures that they have relocated outside the city to 'avoid urban combat' (...) After the fall of Hama, the rebels took the town of Alamiyah, east of the former, after an agreement with the local authorities and without firing a single shot. (...) Iraq's influential Shiite cleric Moqtada al Sadr yesterday asked the Baghdad government not to intervene in any way in the neighboring country.” (El País, 06-12-2024). Iran began evacuating its military commanders and personnel from Syria on Friday, in the words of a military advisor: “Iran is starting to evacuate its forces and military personnel because we cannot fight as an advisory and support force if Syria’s army itself does not want to fight.” (New York Times, 06-12-2024). On the same December 6th, 2024, CNN conducted an interview with the HST leader presenting him de facto as the moderate future ruler of Syria.
The next day, the not-yet-invested Trump wrote on his social networks: “Syria is a mess, but is not our friend, & the United States should have nothing to do with it. This is not our fight. Let it play out. Do not get involved!”. It should be noted that the U.S. military presence in Syria totals 900 soldiers, located far from the advance of HTS militiamen and essentially oblivious to the unfolding events.
As HTS advanced towards Homs, “in the south local insurgents have taken up arms against the regime and, in the east, Kurdish-Arab militias have seized several localities from the regime. (...) Some soldiers have joined the rebels.” (El País, 07-12-2024). The next day, Assad left Damascus, forced by Russia which, on the other hand, provided him and his money with asylum. HTS militiamen entered Homs and Damascus at the same time.
The Syrian Army gave in because it had been eroding in advance: “For years it has been an open secret that there was a black market where soldiers passed weapons and ammunition to HTS members in order to feed their families. Last Wednesday, already with the water up to his neck, El Asad has decreed an increase in the salary of the professional military.” (El Pais, 08-12-2024). “In another proof of the decomposition of the regime's defenses, some 2,000 soldiers have crossed the border into Iraq to seek refuge.” (El País, 08-12-2024).“The week-long path the Islamist-led rebels trod to reach the capital is strewn with the paraphernalia of conflict, from abandoned tanks to piles of army uniforms left by fleeing soldiers.” (Financial Times, 09-12-2024). Apart from the soldiers, the entire civil service corps was in a situation that did not motivate them at all to fulfill their role as the embodiment of the State against the rebels, most have preferred to try their luck as the embodiment of the State of the ex-rebels: “Civil servants earn less than 30 euros a month and in the private sector salaries are not much higher.” (El País, 23-12-2024). Thus, the Syrian State apparatus has placed itself at the service of the new ruling current: “The prime minister, Ghazi al-Jalali, who took office last September, expressed his readiness to cooperate with the new leadership that will be elected by the Syrians. The country is 'free of El Asad', he announced to the rebels as they entered Damascus.” (El País, 09-12-2024). “The Central Bank of Syria issued a message of reassurance and assured on Monday that its depositors' money is safe in their vaults.” (La Vanguardia, 10-12-2024). “The rebel side has also announced a general amnesty for all soldiers who were compulsorily conscripted” (El País, 10-12-2024). For its part, the autonomous government of Syrian Kurdistan has adopted the new flag of the Syrian State. And the effect on Syrian refugees driven out by years of war has been felt almost immediately: ”Hundreds of refugees like them flocked yesterday to the border crossings of Öncüpinar in Kilis province and Cilvegözü in Hatay province to return to their country.” (El País, 10-12-2024).
The new Syrian government is supported by Turkey, the Arab states and the European and US imperialisms. Each for its own reasons, which include, depending on the case, eliminating a source of destabilization and cultivation of Islamist militiamen, trying to regain or gain influence in the area, the return of the 1.5 million refugees to Syria and last but not least the business of reconstruction: “On Wednesday Qatar announced it would reopen its embassy in Damascus, after refusing to do so even when Assad was rehabilitated in the Arab World, returned to the warm bosom of the Arab League and even Saudi Arabia resumed diplomatic ties with him. (…) In the race to the presidential palace in Damascus the Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan came first to shake Al-Shara's hand. The foreign ministers of other Arab states, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are preparing to land in Damascus in the coming days to personally congratulate the leader of the sister state. (…)” (Haaretz, 13-12-2024). The German foreign minister and her French counterpart rushed to visit and negotiate with the new Syrian government.
By withdrawing its support and formally forcing the surrender of the Assad government, Russia has secured for the time being the maintenance of the Russian air base of Khmeimim, in the province of Latakia, and the naval base of Tartus, on the coast, which have been two key geostrategic points for sending Russian weapons and mercenaries from Africa Corps (the former Wagner) to countries such as Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Sudan or Libya. At the same time, Iran has tried to embrace the change of course to try to have options of influence in the future: “In a statement that does not mention El Asad says that Syrians must decide their future ‘without external intervention’ and expresses its desire to continue the ‘friendly’ relationship between the two nations.” (La Vanguardia, 09-12-2024).
For its part, Israel has carried out several bombings against arsenals to prevent them from being used by HTS militiamen and then occupied the demilitarized zone with its army.
The internal decay of the El Asad government, the need to return Syrian refugees by Turkey and the EU, and the comparative example of the administration of capitalism in Idlib by HTS have produced this collapse of the clique that controlled the state. In a similar way to the Taliban in 2021 (see “The Internationalist Proletarian” n.8, December 2021, p.9), the HTS militia has been able to displace the previous ruling apparatus because it had previously proved to be a better manager of capitalism and for the running of the business of the Syrian small and medium bourgeoisie, bringing a momentary relief even for the working class.
“Many Syrians (...) these days speak of the anxiety that they had to pass a check-point every time they moved from one place to another: they knew that to pass it they would have to pay a bribe, although not how much and that depending on the mood of the officer on duty they could end up in the barracks or forcibly enlisted in the army.” (El País, 17-12-2024). The new government has not only eliminated these events at check-points but has said it will “end compulsory military conscription, a nightmare for Syrians inside the country and refugees considering returning. It could last up to 10 years and the possibility of getting out of conscription meant paying thousands of dollars.” (El País, 18-12-2024).
From the point of view of the access to products and their prices, the immediate effect clearly favored stability and social support for the new government: “stores are now lined with Turkish bottled water, Saudi-produced bouillon cubes, Lebanese powdered milk and western chocolate brands such as Twix and Snickers. (...) The new HTS-led government has since permitted transactions in dollars, and on Saturday announced a new set of unified custom fees that it said reduced fees by 50 to 60 per cent. (...) Imported goods that for years flowed from Turkey into the HTS-led northwestern Idlib province have begun passing into the rest of the country. (...) Local brands remain significantly cheaper than foreign ones. (...) a 35-year-old vegetable and fruit seller, said all his produce had dropped in price in the past month, imported or otherwise. Foreign pineapples now cost a fifth their previous price, and local potatoes a fourth.” (Financial Times, 13-01-2025).
The next step is the general disarmament and the “social contract” that guarantees the development of business and the smooth exploitation of the working class. In the declarations of the new Syrian government: “the various rebel factions that united for the offensive, launched from Idlib province in the northwest, ‘will be dismantled’ and their fighters, ‘trained to integrate the ranks of the Ministry of Defense’ ‘All will be subject to the law’. (...) “We must have a state mentality, not an opposition mentality” (...) “Syria must remain united and there must be a social contract between the state and all ethnic or religious communities to ensure social justice.” (El País, 18-12-2024).
It must be said that the social base of the previous government, although greatly reduced by all the material elements that we have been exposing, has not disappeared and there have been demonstrations and some ambushes by groups of supporters of the previous government in Banias, Latakia and Homs.
But the new managing committee of the Syrian bourgeoisie business will try to pull forward the common business through maximum continuity with the State apparatus: “We are trying to safeguard and use the previous structures. For the moment without changing any laws, maintaining the staff and filling in what is missing,” explains Fawaz al Helal. And at the same time “introduce the model and the experience we have followed in Idlib.” (El País, 17-12-2024).
One more step and we will be in the business of reconstruction and debt repayment: “More than 8,000 schools must be rehabilitated and a third of the health system must be put back into service. The cost of building the country would be enormous. Only a couple of hundred million dollars of the $14 billion in foreign exchange reserves recorded in 2011 by the International Monetary Fund remain. Estimates from 2020 suggested that at least $250 billion (240 billion euros) would be needed to repair the worst damage from the war.” (El País, 23-12-2024). And while it is true that the new ruling current will have access to oil wells that were out of the reach of the previous one, given that “The oil wells that remained in the Assad regime's control produced only some 9,000 oil barrels a day, now the new administration can produce oil from the oil yields controlled by the Kurds in the northeast of the state after they retreated from Dir A-Zur, which was reoccupied by the pro-Turkish militias”, the truth is that the debts are very high: “A conservative estimate sets Syria's national debt at some $31 billion, $5 billion of them to the IMF and $26 billion to Russia and to Iran. (…) More realistic estimates cite a debt of more than $30 billion to Iran alone, which invested some $50 billion in the last 14 years. (…)” (Haaretz, 13-12-2024).
The State apparatus has been maintained essentially by promising continuity and national unity. This promised national unity will be built precisely on the basis of the exploitation of the Syrian proletariat to pay for the reconstruction and the accumulated debts.
There will have to re-emerge and develop in Syria, as we expect them to re-emerge and develop in the rest of the capitalist states, organizations of immediate struggle outside the control of the State that will organize the struggle against exploitation. The task of the communists is to recover and reintroduce in the zone – as in the whole world – the approaches of internationalist and intransigent Marxism developing here also the international Party organization, necessary to intervene in the immediate struggle developing it towards a struggle for the overthrow of capitalism. And this revolutionary movement led by the International Communist Party, unlike the current movement of continuity of capitalist management, will not forget to apply the fundamental lesson of Marxism in relation to the State, enunciated by Marx in the “18th Brumaire” (1852) and restored by Lenin in “The State and Revolution” (1917): “the conclusion is extremely precise, definite, practical and palpable: all previous revolutions perfected the State machine, whereas it must be BROKEN, SMASHED. This conclusion is the chief and fundamental point in the Marxist theory of the State”. Only on the basis of this destruction of the bourgeois State can the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat develop towards the withering away of all States once the division into social classes has been eliminated: “The supersession of the bourgeois State by the proletarian State is impossible without a violent revolution. The abolition of the proletarian state, i.e., of the State in general, is impossible except through the process of “withering away"”.